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WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, AND THE NIMBY
PROBLEM
Steven I. Eagle'
This Article explores the clash between federal policies encouraging
wireless communications services and the application of local land use
regulations to the siting of telecommunications towers. It concludes that
Congress's effort to strike a balance in the Telecommunications Act of
1996 between local concerns on one hand and national commerce and
homeland security on the other, has proved vague in content and
susceptible to procedural thickets that might make local parochialism
impervious to challenge. The Article suggests statutory changes, including
time limitations and the creation of presumptions and safe harbor rules,
that might better balance infrastructure development needs with local
autonomy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the Act or TCA) was the first
comprehensive overhaul of national telecommunications policy in over
sixty years, amending the Communications Act of 1934.2 The TCA was
intended to encourage low prices, the deployment of new technologies,
and growth in telecommunications resulting from increased competition
through deregulation.'
Section 704 of the TCA provided for a new "National Wireless
Telecommunications Siting Policy" (section 704 or Siting Policy).4 The
Siting Policy is an important attempt to harmonize local autonomy in
land use regulation and national commerce. The subsequent events of
September 11, 2001 have brought into stark focus that
telecommunications is a vital part of the Nation's critical infrastructure
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Virginia
(seagle@gmu.edu). The author acknowledges with appreciation research support received
from the Critical Infrastructure Protection Project of the National Center for Technology
& Law, George Mason University School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
18, and 47 U.S.C.).
2. Pub. L. No. 73-415, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 17, 18, and 47 U.S.C.A.).
3. See discussion infra Part V.A.
4. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2000). For the statutory text, see infra note 92.
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for national security purposes.5 Intensifying the importance of both the
national commerce and the national security issues, reliance upon
wireless telecommunications continues to grow rapidly.6 Given these
important national concerns, wireless communications tower siting and
design decisions take on an importance beyond the more traditional
tension between local government exercise of the police power to
regulate land use and the private property rights of landowners which are
protected under the Federal Constitution.
Section 704 attempts, within the context of legislation facilitating
wireless communications growth, to respect the state and local authority
over land use recognized by the Supreme Court almost eighty years ago
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.7 Indeed, the Siting Policy is
entitled "Preservation of local zoning authority."" I argue that this effort
has enjoyed only mixed success, and that this largely is attributable to the
fact that the Act reflects some naive assumptions about the nature of
local land use regulation.9 While regulation should be done at the lowest
appropriate level of government, there are systemic reasons why
municipalities might not perform that function well- especially when
national economic development and security are factored in. The
concluding sections of this Article suggest that the TCA should be
amended to provide the practical balance between local and national
interests that Congress might have intended.
1I. WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS-GROWTH AND DEREGULATION
A. Federal Regulation of Wireless Communications
Invoking its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,'0
the Federal Government has regulated wireless communications since
the Radio Act of 19271 declared governmental ownership of the radio
frequency spectrum and preempted state laws that would interfere with
its use.2 The Communications Act of 1934, which replaced the Radio
Act, provided for the establishment of the Federal Communications
5. See discussion infra Part IIl.
6. See discussion infra Part II.B.
7. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7); see discussion infra Part V.
9. See discussion infra Part V.C.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress Shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce... among the several States ...").




Commission (FCC),3 which in turn has undertaken to regulate
developing communications media under a public interest standard.'"
B. Growth in Wireless Service
The Siting Policy employs the generic term "personal wireless
services" (PWS) as a descriptor for wireless telephony, including cellular
phone and Personal Communications Systems (PCS) phone service."
Originally employed for automobile phones in 1974, analogue systems
were developed for more general use through the mid-1980s.1
6
Thereafter, new digital phone services provided much clearer
transmissions, with up to twenty times the number of calls that could be
handled per channel."' The next generation of technology, PCS, permits
both voice and data signals to be transmitted to individuals outdoors and
indoors and could replace other services in fixed location and mobile
markets.8  However, PCS requires more advanced equipment. 9  Most
notably for present purposes, its higher frequency transmissions require
smaller cells20 and, therefore, a multiplicity of cell towers.
2'
Cellular telephone service in the United States has grown at a
phenomenal rate. According to a June 2003 FCC report, "[oince solely a
business tool, wireless phones are now a mass-market consumer device.
The overall wireless penetration rate (defined as the number of wireless
subscribers divided by the total U.S. population) in the United States is
now at 49 percent.,
22
13. See 47 U.S.C § 151 (2000).
14. See David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities
Will Climb to Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469, 474 (1998).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(C)(i) (2000). ("[T]he term 'personal wireless services'
means commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless services, and common carrier
wireless exchange access services .... ).
16. See Gregory Tan, Note, Wading Through the Rhetoric of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996: Uncertainty of Local Zoning Authority over Wireless Telecommunications
Tower Siting, 22 VT. L. REV. 461,470 (1997).
17. See generally id. at 470-71 (explaining the technology of cellular systems).
18. See id. at 471-72.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 472.
21. See Jaymes D. Littlcjohn, The Impact of Land Use Regulation on Cellular
Communications: Is Federal Preemption Warranted?, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 247, 249 (1993)
(citing V. H. MacDonald, The Cellular Concept, 58 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 15, 20-22 (1979)).
22. In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions
with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 18 FCC REC. 14,783, 101, at 14,831 (2003)
[hereinafter Eighth Report] (footnotes omitted), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-03-150Al.pdf.
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Cellular service first was licensed by the FCC in 1983. By the end of
1994, there were more than twenty-four million subscribers, and cellular
service was available to most Americans." During the past twenty years,
the number of wireless telephone subscribers has mushroomed. Starting
from a base of some 92,000 subscribers at the end of 1984, the number
exceeded 1.2 million by the end of 1987.24 It grew to over eleven million
by the end of 1992, to over fifty-five million by the end of 1997, and to
over 109 million by the end of 2000.25 By the end of 2003, it had reached
almost 159 million .2 According to the Cellular Telecommunications &
Internet Association (CTIA) (the wireless telecommunications industry
trade association), in October 2004 there were over 170,000,000 current
U.S. wireless subscribers.27 During 2002, the mobile telephone industry
28generated over $76 billion in revenues . This is not to say, however, that
29the wireless industry has surplus cash.
In its Triennial Report, the FCC termed this growth in the number of
mass market wireless subscriber lines "remarkable. "30 It added:
Over 90 percent of the United States population lives in
counties served by three or more wireless operators; about two
in five Americans now have a mobile phone. Prices for wireless
service have steadily declined in recent years ... . Notably, 3 to
5 percent of wireless customers use their wireless phone as their
only phone.3
23. FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, TRENDS IN TELFPHONE SERVICE 11-36





27. See the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association's (CTIA) web site,
Press Release, CITIA, Homeland Security Supported by Wireless Initiatives (May 28,
2004), at http://www.ctia.orglnews-media/press/body.cfm?recordid=1408 (last visited
Nov. 4, 2004), listing 171,128,825 subscribers as of November 4, 2004.
28. Press Release, FCC Adopts Annual Report on State of Competition in the
Wireless Industry (June 26, 2003) 1, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DOC-235838Al .pdf.
29. See Laura H. Phillips & Jason E. Friedrich, Wireless: Can Regulatory "Business as
Usual" Continue?, COMM. LAW., Fall 2002, at 12, 12 (noting that billions of dollars in
equity have gone to build out cellular systems and that the industry "is in a classic early
stage and has yet to mature and produce the hoped-for financial payoff").
30. In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capability, 18 FCC REC. 16,978, 53, at 17,017 (2003) [hereinafter
Triennial Review Order], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
FCC-03-36Al.pdf.
31. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Although in 2002 only two percent of subscribers had completely
switched from landline to wireless telephone service," wireless
technology is becoming increasingly competitive with landline telephone
service. Also, mobile data services have grown rapidly, growing from
between two and 2.5 million subscribers in 2000 to between eight and ten
million subscribers in 2001."3 As "wireless technology continues to
improve, wireless may become a more practical and attractive alternative
to wireline for data services. '3 4  In confirmation of the increasing
importance of wireless telephone service, the number of payphones in
the United States has declined from over two million in 1997 to under 1.5
million in 2003.'-
III. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND HOMELAND SECURITY
A. A History of Concern About Security and Telecommunications
Interest in the role of telecommunications in protecting the security of
the United States is not a new phenomenon. In 1982, President Ronald
Reagan established the President's National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee.36 The Committee was given
responsibility to provide "information and advice from the perspective of
the telecommunications industry with respect to the implementation of
Presidential Directive 53 (PD/NSC-53), National Security
Telecommunications Policy. ' ' 7 The Federal Government long has been
cognizant of the need to incorporate private facilities into emergency
planning, including an early precursor of wireless services, citizens band
radio.38
In 1996, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order No.
13010, noting that "[c]ertain national infrastructures are so vital that their
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense
or economic security of the United States. These critical infrastructures
32. Colleen Bryan, Note, Number Portability for Consumers: Taking Your Wireless
Number with You, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 267, 283 (2004).
33. Triennial Review Order, supra note 30, n.185.
34. Id.
35. FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, supra note 23, at 7-8 tbl.7.6.
36. Exec. Order No. 12,382, 47 Fed. Reg. 40,531, § 1(a) (Sept. 13, 1982).
37. Id. § 2(a).
38. See Meeting Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 3598, 3598 (Jan. 26, 1982) (outlining the
Citizens Band Radio Communications Subcommittee's agenda to approve of the
prototype plan, "'Citizens Band Radio Service Plan for the Support of Local Government
During Emergencies.').
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include telecommunications ....,, While telecommunications obviously
is necessary for national defense, the Executive order also recognizes
that it constitutes a crucial component of our civilian economy.
The "public safety and non-commercial uses of wireless capabilities
have continued to grow. Public safety entities have attempted to
improve their communications infrastructure to meet, among other
needs, homeland security requirements and to respond to national or
local emergencies. "4 Furthermore, "[w]ireless phones have gained new
prominence as a result of the critical role they played in reestablishing
communications on September 11, 2001, and have moved to the forefront
of national emergency planning, national security, and priority access
regimes. ,'' The events of 9/11 also have reminded private businesses, as
well as families, of the benefits of wireless communication in dealing with
crisis situations.
B. The Homeland Security Act and the Department of Homeland Security
Some fourteen months after the devastating attacks against New York
and Washington, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(HSA) z The HSA established the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).43 "The primary mission of the Department is to ... reduce the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism," reduce damage that
terrorist acts might cause, coordinate efforts to deal with natural and
manmade crises, and "ensure that the overall economic security of the
United States is not diminished ....""
39. Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347, 37,347 (July 17, 1996); id. § 1
(establishing the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection).
40. Richard E. Wiley & Rosemary C. Harold, Communications Law 2003: Changes
and Challenges, in 21ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY &
REGULATION, 275, 316 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course,
Handbook Series No, GO-015D, 2003), WL 773PLI/Pat 275.
41. Phillips & Friedrich, supra note 29, at 12.
42. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5,6, 18, 44, and 49 U.S.C.A).
43. 6 U.S.C.A. § 111(a) (West Supp. 2004). For a detailed analysis and critique of the
functions of the Department of Homeland Security, see generally Recent Developments,
Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 513 (2003).
44. 6 U.S.C.A. § 111(b) (West Supp. 2004). Section 111(b) states:
(b) Mission
(1) In general
The primary mission of the Department is to-
(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
(B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism;
(C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist
attacks that do occur within the United States;
[Vol. 54:445
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Among the functions assigned the DHS Office of Science and
Technology is "[t]o carry out research, development, testing, evaluation,
and cost-benefit analyses in fields that would improve the safety,
effectiveness, and efficiency of law enforcement technologies used by
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, including, but not
limited to . . wire and wireless interoperable communication
technologies.,45
A part of title II of the HSA, known as the Critical Infrastructure
Information Act of 2002,46 provides for the protection of voluntarily
submitted information concerning critical infrastructure.47 The term
"critical infrastructure information" is defined as "information not
customarily in the public domain and related to the security of critical
infrastructure or protected systems" that relates to actual or potential
threats, weaknesses, or operational problems 8  Threats to critical
infrastructure or protected systems include "the misuse of or
unauthorized access to all types of communications and data
transmission systems." 49  Likewise, "protected systems" include a
"communications network . . . or data in transmission. '"5°  Such
voluntarily shared information is exempted from Freedom of
Information Act disclosure," and, inter alia, from direct use by federal or
state agencies in civil actions .
The HSA was partly built upon earlier links between national
preparedness and telecommunications. In 1984, President Ronald
Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12472, establishing a National
(D) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department,
including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and
emergency planning;
(E) ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the
Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not
diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress;
(F) ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not
diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland;
and
(G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism,
coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts
to interdict illegal drug trafficking.
Id.
45. Id. § 162(b)(6)(E).
46. 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 131-134 (West Supp. 2004).
47. 6 U.S.C.A. § 133 (West Supp. 2004).
48. Id. § 131(3).
49. Id. § 131(3)(A).
50. Id. § 131(6)(B).
51. Id. § 133(a)(1)(A) (referring to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2000)).
52. Id. § 133(a)(1)(C).
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Communications System (NCS).53 The NCS was charged, inter alia, with
responsiveness to "the national security and emergency preparedness
needs of the President and the Federal departments, agencies and other
entities, including telecommunications in support of national security
leadership and continuity of government. 54 Also, the NCS would work
to ensure that the system was "capable of satisfying priority
telecommunications requirements under all circumstances through use of
commercial, government and privately owned telecommunications
resources."55 The FCC has promulgated regulations for Priority Access
56
Service for National Security and Emergency Preparedness.
For national security as well as for commercial purposes, wireless
telephony, data transmission, and the cyberinfrastructure are inextricably
linked. Networked computers store and move vast amounts of financial
and other business data and transactions. "The National Research
Council noted more than a decade ago that '[t]hey control power
delivery, communications, aviation, and financial services. They are used
to store vital information, from medical records to business plans to
criminal records.' 57 Wireless communications services play an important
and growing role in data transmission. In a 2003 report, the FCC
published the estimate of an industry analyst that "11.9 million, or 8
percent, of the 141.8 [million] mobile telephone subscribers at the end of
2002 subscribed to some type of mobile Internet service." Furthermore,
"[a]n additional 2.3 million consumers subscribed to mobile Internet
services on data-only mobile devices at the end of 2002."'9
C. Homeland Security Activities of the Wireless Telecommunications
Industry
According to CTIA, industry efforts to support homeland security as
of May 2004 included:
Many of the major wireless carriers have developed a fleet of
COW's or Cell Sites on Wheels. These systems are sent to
areas in need to replace towers that may have been damaged or
53. Exec. Order No. 12,472, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,471, § 1(a) (Apr. 5, 1984).
54. Id. § 1(c)(1).
55. Id. § 1(c)(2).
56. See, e.g., Priority Access Service (PAS) for National Security and Emergency
Prcparcdness (NSEP), 47 C.F.R. pt. 64 app. B (2003).
57. Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons: Overcoming Fundamental
Vulnerabilities to Critical Infrastructures in a Networked World, 58 BUS. LAW. 349, 350
(2002) (alteration in original) (quoting NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT
RISK: SAFE COMPUTING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7 (1991)).
58. Eighth Report, supra note 22, T 117, at 14,793 (citing Luiz CARVALHO ET AL.,




destroyed. Other carriers have launched satellite versions of
the smaller mobile sites-SatCOLTs-to help get networks
back up and running after disasters. These sites can be up and
running in a matter of hours to ensure communications
continue during and after emergency situations.
Multiple wireless carriers are in the process of implementing
a Priority Access program allowing government officials and
first responders access to wireless networks in the event of an
emergency. Under this system, wireless carriers allocate a
certain amount of capacity for priority users during
emergencies. Priority service does not terminate calls in
progress-rather, as callers hang up, the switch designates a
portion of the newly vacated voice channels to authorized
priority users, who must dial in a feature code. Regardless of
how high wireless usage surges, public safety officials will still
be able to communicate in an emergency situation.
The Washington, D.C. area will soon be home to the Capital
Wireless Integrated Network, a secure and powerful wireless
network allowing officials from more than 40 local, state and
federal agencies to communicate with each other using instant
messaging on devices such as PCs, PDAs, and data-enabled
mobile phones.wu
IV. TOWER SITING AND THE NIMBY PROBLEM
A. Tragedy of the Commons and the Anticommons
Garrett Hardin, in his classic exposition of The Tragedy of the
Commons, posited that everyone has a huge incentive to overexploit a
common resource and fail to manage it prudently, since many others will
do the same and will not be impressed by isolated examples of good
stewardship. 61 The tragedy of the anticommons, on the other hand, is
that so many individuals and groups might have property rights that
60. Press Release, supra note 27.
61. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
However, Hardin actually was referring to an "open access regime," where no one claims
ownership rights, rather than to a "commons." which is the collective property of a defined
group. See David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights,
31 J. LEG. STUD. S545, S557 (2002). See generally, Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property
Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000) (describing
complex pattern of private and common land uses in medieval fields). True commons
resources may be open access to group members but are private property to outsiders.
Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 813,817 n. 12 (2003).
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include veto power over a resource so that it would be impractical or
62
impossible for the resource to be economically developed.
A significant problem facing the United States is that we have a
national commons, dubbed a "cybercomnmons," comprised of data
63production, storage, and communications networks. While the Internet
is a substantial element of the cybercommons, Internet traffic
increasingly is being conducted through wireless telecommuncations.
The cybercommons has become an integral part of a much older
commons-the common market that was one of the principal objects of
the Framers when they created a nation that places great emphasis on
the protection of interstate commerce from the parochial concerns of
individual states. To a certain extent, owners of intellectual property and
specialized resources in cyberspace band together to establish and police
their own common areas within the overall cybercommons as is
practical. 65
In protecting the cybercommons and wireless telecommunications we
face a collective problem. The costs of organizing and coordinating large
numbers of individuals and organizations are great. Typically, the
amount at stake for any single member is so small as to make
organization utterly impractical. As the late Mancur Olson argued in his
classic The Logic of Collective Action: "[U]nless the number of
individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest,
rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interests. 66
While the majority of adult Americans now enjoy the benefits of
wireless communications, that benefit is so diffused that it is difficult to
entice individuals to expend time and resources to defend it. On the
other hand, the seamless web of wireless communications is vulnerable to
more parochial concerns. Wireless towers must grow in number and
must be located in individual polities, often small and homogeneous
suburban municipalities, that are in a practical position to block or
hinder the national telecommunications network.
62. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621, 622 (1998).
63. See generally Frye, supra note 57.
64. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
65. Frye, supra note 57, at 361-62 (describing private-sector efforts to protect
cyberinfrastructure); see also Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of
Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155
(1998).
66. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1971).
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If we want to prevent a "tragedy of the cybercommons ' '67 resulting
from national security threats such as terrorism, we will require
intervention by the HAS, other federal agencies, and collaborating state
and local law enforcement units. In addition, however, the nurturing of a
robust and growing telecommunications network protecting both the
economy and national security requires that anticommons claims be held
in check. This necessitates the development of governmental policies
that do not unduly hinder private efforts to develop robust
communications networks.
B. The NIMBY Problem
The NIMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome reflects the fact that
owner-occupied housing is the most valuable asset that the vast majority
of people ever will own and their rational belief that deterioration in the
neighborhood will affect its value. 68 This accounts for homeowners'
exquisite interest in neighborhood change. According to Professor
William Fischel, a Dartmouth land use economist and sometimes public
servant:
NIMBYs show up at the zoning and planning board reviews, to
which almost all developers of more-than-minor subdivisions
must submit. If NIMBYs fail to reduce the scale and density of
the project at these reviews, they often deploy alternative
regulatory rationales, such as environmental impact statements,
historic districts, aboriginal burial sites, agricultural
preservation, wetlands, flood plains, access for the disabled and
protection of (often unidentified) endangered species at other
local, state and federal government forums, including courts of
law. I have heard all of these arguments, and others too
elaborately bizarre to list, in my ten years as a member of the
Hanover, New Hampshire zoning board. And if NIMBYs fail
in these efforts, they seek, often by direct democratic initiatives,
to have the local zoning and planning regulations changed to
69make sure that similar developments do not happen again.
NIMBYism also affects individuals' reactions to wireless towers.70 The
following anecdote is but one example:
67. See generally Frye, supra note 57.
68. See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A
Comment on Robert Nelson's "Privatizing the Neighborhood," 7 GEO. MASON L. REV.
881, 881 (1999).
69. Id. at 881-82.
70. See Malcolm J. Tuesley, Note, Not in My Backyard: The Siting of Wireless
Communications Facilities, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 887, 897 (1999).
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Henry county commissioners are working on plans to
strengthen the county's ordinance governing sites for [wireless
communications] towers.
"By and large, the towers are ugly, and people don't want
them in their back yards," said Commissioner Brian Williams.
"If folks would stay off their cell phones there would be no
need for the towers," the commissioner said before he ended an
interview using his cell phone.71
The following excerpt from a 1998 Fourth Circuit case involving the
attempt by a church to lease some of its property for wireless towers
gives some flavor of the circumstances that often underlie a permit
denial:
Virginia Beach's Zoning Ordinance required the Church to
secure a conditional use permit to allow AT & T and PrimeCo
to build their towers. Accordingly, the Church filed an
application with the City Planning Department, which, after
making some modifications to appellees' proposal,
recommended approval to the City Planning Commission. The
Planning Commission then held a public hearing on January 8,
1997. Representatives of the companies and of the Church
advocated approving the application, as did some
commissioners and city officials, but numerous area residents
spoke against approval, largely on the grounds that such a
commercial use of the Church property was improper in a
residential area and that the towers, even with various aesthetic
modifications made by the companies, would be eyesores. One
resident submitted a petition in opposition, with ninety
signatures that he had collected in the day and a half prior to
the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Planning
Commission voted unanimously, with one abstention, to
recommend that the City Council approve the application.
The City Council considered the application at its meeting on
March 25, 1997. Having been provided with copies of the
Planning Department's report, the transcript of the Planning
Commission hearing, and the various application materials, the
City Council also heard further testimony on the matter.
Again, representatives of the companies and of the Church
explained and supported the application; numerous area
residents spoke, all of those not affiliated with the Church being
opposed. One resident, Mr. Wayne Shank, presented petitions
with over seven hundred signatures in opposition. The Council
71. Peter Scott, Communication Towers Follow the Growth, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Dec. 28, 2000, at J15.
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also appears to have had before it one shorter petition
supporting the application and various letters to councilmen on
the matter, both in support and in opposition. The only
councilman to speak on the merits, Councilman William
Harrison (who represents Little Neck), voiced his opposition in
light of the testimony of area residents who did not think that
improved service was worth the burden of having the towers
looming over them.
The Council ultimately voted unanimously to deny the
application.... "72
From the industry's point of view, NIMBYism presents a vexing
addition to an elaborate regulatory process:
Imagine that you own a business in a service industry. Before
you can operate this business, the federal government requires
that you purchase an expensive license allowing you to conduct
your business within a specific geographic area. In addition,
before you can expand your infrastructure to improve and
expand your services, you must receive approval from the local
zoning board. When you apply to the local zoning board for a
conditional use permit to site your new infrastructure, and you
satisfy all of the board's requirements, they deny your
application; local citizens groups have pressured this board to
implement a moratorium against the expansion of businesses of
your type. The basis for this moratorium is steeped in myth and
unfounded community hysteria that your infrastructure causes
cancer and birth defects, deflates adjacent property values, and
the prevailing attitude that your business has already expanded
enough within city limits. The board even hears testimony from
an environmental group arguing that your industry regulations
were written by a former Nazi thus making them illegal. This
hypothetical scenario may sound far-fetched, but it occurs on a
daily basis in the wireless telecommunications industry.73
C. The Need for Congressional Action
In 1995, the U.S. House of Representatives passed House Bill 1555,
the Communications Act of 1995. 7  The bill was designed to decrease the
price and encourage the development of new telecommunications
technologies through deregulation.75 Section 107 would amend the
72. AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423,425 (4th Cir. 1998).
73. Hughes, supra note 14, at 470.
74. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. (1995).
75. Id.
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Communications Act of 1934 by adding a provision on facilities siting."The House's intent was to provide federal standards for wireless
76. Id. § 107. Section 107 states:
(a) NATIONAL WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SITING POLICY.-
Section 332(c) of the Act (47 U.S.C. 332(c)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
"(7) FACILITIES SITING POLICIES.-(A) Within 180 days after enactment of
this paragraph, the Commission shall prescribe and make effective a policy
rcgarding State and local regulation of the placement, construction, modification,
or operation of facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services.
"(B) Pursuant to subchapter III of chapter 5, title 5, United States
Code, the Commission shall establish a negotiated rulemaking committee to
negotiate and develop a proposed policy to comply with the requirements of this
paragraph. Such committee shall include representatives from State and local
governments, affected industries, and public safety agencies. In negotiating and
developing such a policy, the committee shall take into account-
"(i) the desirability of enhancing the coverage and
quality of commercial mobile services and fostering competition in the provision
of such services;
"(ii) the legitimate interests of State and local
governments in matters of exclusively local concern;
"(iii) the effect of State and local regulation of facilities
siting on interstate commerce; and
"(iv) the administrative costs to State and local
governments of reviewing requests for authorization to locate facilities for the
provision of commercial mobile services.
"(C) The policy prescribed pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure
that-
"(i) regulation of the placement, construction, and
modification of facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services by any
State or local government or instrumentality thereof-
"(I) is reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and
limited to the minimum necessary to accomplish the State or local government's
legitimate purposes; and
"(II) does not prohibit or have the effect of
precluding any commercial mobile service; and
"(ii) a State or local government or instrumentality
thereof shall act on any request for authorization to locate, construct, modify, or
operate facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services within a
reasonable period of time after the request is fully filed with such government or
instrumentality; and
"(iii) any decision by a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof to deny a request for authorization to locate, construct,
modify, or operate facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services shall
be in writing and shall be supported by substantial evidence contained in a
written record.
"(D) The policy prescribed pursuant to this paragraph shall
provide that no State or local government or any instrumentality thereof may
regulate the placement, construction, modification, or operation of such facilities
on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions, to the
extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations concerning
such emissions.
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communications tower siting, with some local input. In reporting out
House Bill 1555, the Commerce Committee discussed why it believed
such action necessary:
The Committee finds that current State and local requirements,
siting and zoning decisions by non-federal units of government,
have created an inconsistent and, at times, conflicting
patchwork of requirements which will inhibit the deployment of
Personal Communications Services (PCS) as well as the
rebuilding of a digital technology-based cellular
telecommunications network. The Committee believes it is in
the national interest that uniform, consistent requirements, with
adequate safeguards of the public health and safety, be
established as soon as possible. Such requirements will ensure
an appropriate balance in policy and will speed deployment and
the availability of competitive wireless telecommunications
services which ultimately will provide consumers with lower
costs as well as with a greater range and options for such
services. 7
Notable among the House "Facilities Siting Policies" provisions was
the establishment of a rulemaking committee that would develop policy.
The committee would comprise the major interested groups, state and
local officials, public safety agencies, and representatives from "affected
industries," which presumably would include user groups as well as
telecommunications providers. On the one hand, this group would
explicitly take into account the enhancement of wireless services and
competition among providers, 79 and the effects of local regulation of
siting on interstate commerce. M On the other hand, it would take into
account "the legitimate interests of State and local governments in
matters of exclusively local concern, ' ' " as well as the administrative costs
incurred by municipalities in processing facility location requests. 2 The
policy would aim to ensure, inter alia, that local and state "regulation of
the placement, construction, and modification of facilities" "is
"(E) In accordance with subchapter III of chapter 5, title 5,
United States Code, the Commission shall periodically establish a negotiated
rulemaking committee to review the policy prescribed by the Commission under
this paragraph and to recommend revisions to such policy."
Id. § 107(a).
77. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 94 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61.
78. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 107(a)(7)(B) (1995).
79. Id. § 107(a)(7)(B)(i).
80. Id. § 107(a)(7)(B)(iii).
81. Id. § 107(a)(7)(B)(ii).
82. Id. § 107(a)(7)(B)(iv).
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reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and limited to the minimum necessary to




House Bill 1555 also included a provision that the Federal
Government make federal property, including rights of way and
easements, available for wireless telecommunications facility siting to the
greatest extent possible. 84 Finally, it provided that, on the basis of this
deliberative process, and within 180 days after the siting policies were
enacted, the FCC "shall prescribe and make effective a policy regarding
State and local regulation of the placement, construction, modification,
or operation of facilities for the provision of commercial mobile
services." 85
The House Commerce Committee was not unaware of the concerns
that local officials had about federal intervention in land use regulation
pertaining to towers. It declared:
The Committee recognizes that there are legitimate State and
local concerns involved in regulating the siting of such facilities
and believes the negotiated rulemaking committee should
address those matters, such as aesthetic values and the costs
associated with the use and maintenance of public rights-of-
way. The intent of the Committee is that requirements
resulting from the negotiated rulemaking committee's work and
subsequent Commission rulemaking will allow construction of a
CMRS network at a lower cost for siting and construction
compatible with legitimate public health, safety and property
protections while fully addressing the legitimate concerns of all
affected 8parties and providing certainty for planning and
building.
The siting provisions of House Bill 1555 had considerable opposition in
the House itself. Representative James Moran, whose proffered
amendment was not permitted to come to a vote,87 declared that there
was
a real sleeper in this bill, and that is with regard to the siting of
these control towers. There are about 20,000 of them around
the country now. There are going to be about 100,000. Our
amendment said on private property, if you try to site a
commercial tower, then the people that own that property have
a right to go to their local zoning board.
83. Id. § 107(a)(7)(C)(i).
84. Id. § 107(c).
85. Id. § 107(a)(7)(A).
86. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 94-95 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61.




Of course they have the right. Imagine if somebody tries to
put a 150 foot tower on your property, and you object, and they
tell you, "Well, the Congress gave us the authority to put it on.
It is a Federal law. It supersedes local zoning authority." That
is the last thing we want to be doing."s
The Senate bill corresponding to House Bill 1555 had no provision
respecting telecommunications siting.' 9 The House-Senate conference
produced the subsequently enacted version of the TCA. This version did
contain a siting facilities provision, but it was considerably different from
that adopted by the House.
The conference agreement creates a new section 704 which
prevents Commission preemption of local and State land use
decisions and preserves the authority of State and local
governments over zoning and land use matters except in the
limited circumstances set forth in the conference agreement. 90
V. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT SITING POLICY ATTEMPTS A
BALANCE OF RIGHTS
A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The TCA has been described by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit as "an omnibus overhaul of the federal regulation of
communications companies, intended 'to provide for a pro-competitive,
deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and
information technologies and services . . . by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition. ...
The Siting Policy of the TCA is styled, "Preservation of local zoning
authority." ' State and local authority pertaining to "decisions regarding
88. Id.
89. See S. 652, 104th Cong. (1995).
90. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 207-08 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124, 222.
91. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 113, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124).
92. 47 U.S.C. § 332(7) (2000).
(7) Preservation of local zoning authority
(A) General authority
Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect
the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over
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the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless
service facilities" are constrained or affected only by the specific
limitations contained in the siting paragraph.93 Beyond those limitations,
nothing in the Communications Act would limit or affect the authority of
a state or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions
regarding the "placement, construction, and modification of personal
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of
personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or
instrumentality thereof-
(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of
functionally equivalent services; and
(11) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services.
(ii) A State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on
any request for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless
service facilities within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed
with such government or instrumentality, taking into account the nature and
scope of such request.
(iii) Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality
thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service
facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a
written record.
(iv) No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate
the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service
facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to
the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations
concerning such emissions.
(v) Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a
State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with
this subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act,
commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear
and decide such action on an expedited basis. Any person adversely affected by
an act or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality
thereof that is inconsistent with clause (iv) may petition the Commission for
relief.
(C) Definitions
For purposes of this paragraph-
(i) the term "personal wireless services" means commercial mobile
services, unlicensed wireless services, and common carrier wireless exchange
access services;
(ii) the term "personal wireless service facilities" means facilities for the
provision of personal wireless services; and
(iii) the term "unlicensed wireless service" means the offering of
telecommunications services using duly authorized devices which do not require
individual licenses, but does not mean the provision of direct-to-home satellite
services (as defined in section 303(v) of this title).
Id.
93. Id. § 332(c)(7).
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wireless service facilities," "except as provided in this [siting]
paragraph.
94
While the House version would have cabined local discretion within
negotiated policies established by the FCC, the Conference Committee
attempted to temper such discretion primarily through the imposition of
procedure. This is not to say that section 704 retains none of the bite of
the FCC siting rules envisioned in the House version. "The TCA 'effects
substantive changes to the local zoning process ... by preempting any
local regulations, including zoning regulations, which conflict with its
provisions.' 95 Accordingly, local zoning measures are permissible only
to the extent they do not interfere with the TCA.96  The particular
statutory language provides that, although the TCA preserves local
zoning authority in all other respects over the siting of wireless facilities,
"'the method by which siting decisions are made is now subject to judicial
oversight.' 97 Specifically, according to the language of the TCA, a denial
of a request to build wireless facilities must be "'in writing and supported
by substantial evidence contained in a written record."' 98
That said, preemptive exceptions to a contrary default rule do not
augur for smooth implementation. The result of legislation that
embodies "seemingly mutually exclusive propositions"" might better be
described as a lack of clarity masquerading as simplicity. As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, the Siting Policy
"fairly bristles with potential issues, from the proper allocation of the
burden of proof through the available remedies for violation of the
statute's requirements. ' m
Courts interpreting the Siting Policy have been cognizant of the need
to balance its conflicting goals. Section 704 "works like a scale that...
attempts to balance two objects of competing weight: on one arm sits the
need to accelerate the deployment of telecommunications technology,
while on the other arm rests the desire to preserve state and local control
94. Id. § 332(c)(7)(A).
95. SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 112 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D.
Conn. 2000) (quoting Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D.
Mass. 1997)).
96. Sprint Spectrum, 982 F. Supp. at 50.
97. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal citation
omitted)).
98. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)).
99. Kevin M. O'Neill, Note, Wireless Facilities Are a Towering Problem: How Can
Local Zoning Boards Make the Call Without Violating Section 704 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 975, 985 (1999).
100. Cellular Tel., 166 F.3d at 494.
2005]
Catholic University Law Review
over zoning matters."' ' Similarly, it is "a deliberate compromise
between two competing aims-to facilitate nationally the growth of
wireless telephone service and to maintain substantial local control over
siting of towers."'0 2
Putting it another way, in adopting the Siting Policy, Congress
attempted to have the federal versus local regulatory conundrum decided
both ways. Congressman Thomas Bliley, chairman of the Commerce
Committee at the time of the TCA's enactment, explained:
Nothing is in this bill that prevents a locality . . . from
determining where a cellular pole should be located, but we do
want to make sure that this technology is available across the
country, that we do not allow a community to say we are not
going to have any cellular pole in our locality. That is wrong.
Nor are we going to say they can delay these people forever.
But the location will be determined by the local governing
body.'0 3
B. Specific Siting Policy Provisions
Since section 704 operates not through affirmative federal rules, but
rather through oversight of the operation of state and local land use
decisions, its real significance must be gleaned from an examination of
judicial review of specific provisions.
1. Burden of Proof
Given that so many of the reasons why a tower application might be
denied are subjective, or at least not easily quantifiable, establishing
which party has the burden of proof is important in the determination.
The Siting Policy contains no provision explicitly assigning the burden.
Courts are divided as to whether section 704 shifts the burden of proof
to the government agency that denied the applicant's siting request. In
Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of Amherst,'9 the
court held that once the carrier has come forward with minimal
information in support of its application, the Siting Policy "places the
burden of proof to support any denial on the local government entity
issuing the denial."'0'5 Other courts have agreed.1
101. ATC Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2002).
102. Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 13 (1st
Cir. 1999).
103. 141 CONG. REC. H8274 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
104. 74 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.N.H. 1998), vacated and remanded by 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.
1999).
105. Id. at 122.
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In Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton,'7 the court explained that
the burden is on the government "'rather than burdening the applicant
with producing substantial evidence supporting its approval.""' Easton
added that "because the TCA 'effectively preempts state law in several
respects, including the burden of proof, . . . it is the Board's burden to
produce substantial evidence supporting its denial of plaintiff's
application. ' '
Other courts have held that the burden is on the applicant. The
reasoning in Easton, for instance, was attacked by a U.S. district court in
Michigan in New Par v. City of Saginaw:"
This Court is not persuaded by [Easton's] reasoning, nor can it
find any justification for a burden-shifting requirement in the
plain language of the Act, especially in light of the provision
stating that "nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the
authority of a State or local government or instrumentality
thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facilities."'..
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled similarly in
Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Todd,"2 where it said that there
was nothing in the Act that would "support placing a burden upon the
Board." '. 3 Other courts have concurred.
1 4
106. See, e.g., Laurence Wolf Capital Mgmt. Trust v. City of Ferndale, 128 F. Supp. 2d
441, 446 (E.D. Mich. 2000), affd in part and rev'd in part, 61 Fed. Appx. 204 (6th Cir.
2003); PrimeCo Pers. Communications, L.P. v. Vill. of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1064
(N.D. Il. 1998); Cellco P'ship v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182 (D.
Conn. 1998); Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 995 F. Supp. 52, 56 (D. Conn.
1998).
107. 982 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1997).
108. Id. at 49 (quoting United States Cellular Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, LACL No.
CL 00070195 (Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk County 1997)).
109. Id. at 52 (quoting Cellular Corp., at 5).
110. 161 F. Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
111. Id. at 768 n.1 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A)).
112. 244 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2001).
113. Id. at 63.
114. See, e.g., MetroPCS, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009-10
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that applicant had burden of proof to show that city planning
commission's denial of conditional use permit to allow mounting of antennas on parking
garage roof was not based upon the substantial evidence on the record); see also
VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County, 342 F.3d 818. 830-31 (7th Cir. 2003);
Am. Tower LP v. City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203, 1207-08 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
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2. Discrimination Among Providers
Section 704's requirement that localities "shall not unreasonably
discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services"'' 5
prohibits denial of digital wireless communications service permits on the
basis that satisfactory analogue service is already in place. In AT & T
Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council,"6 the district court found a violation of
the anti-discrimination requirement when the only basis in the record for
the denial was one councilman's assertion that local residents "were
satisfied with their current analog service and did not wish [for], or felt
they needed, digital service.""1
7
3. Prohibition of Wireless Services
The heart of the House-Senate compromise, embodied in section 704,
is that states and localities can regulate the placement of wireless towers
but cannot prohibit them."18 This requirement is explicit,"' but the courts
have split on its meaning. The Fourth Circuit consistently has taken the
position that "a telecommunications provider could not prevail in a
challenge to an individual zoning decision absent a general ban or policy
to reject all applications."' 20 Furthermore, "'[t]he burden for the carrier
invoking this provision is a heavy one: to show from language or
circumstances not just that this application has been rejected, but that
further reasonable efforts are so likely to be fruitless that it is a waste of
time to try."" 2' Other courts have agreed.
22
The First Circuit's approach, announced in Town of Amherst v.
Omnipoint Communications Enterprises,23  disparaged the town's
assertion that the Act prohibited only "'general' bans.', 24 "If the criteria
[for permit approvals] or their administration effectively preclude towers
115. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(1) (2000).
116. 979 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd in part and rev'd in part, 155 F.3d 423, 431
(4th Cir. 1998).
117. Id. at 425-26.
118. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 103.
119. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (2000) (stating that state and local siting
regulations "shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal
wireless services").
120. USCOC of Va. RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Supervisors, 343 F.3d
262, 268 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing AT & T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 428-29).
121. id. (quoting 3600 Communications Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 211 F.3d 79, 88 (4th
Cir. 2000)).
122. See, e.g., Cellco P'ship v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184-85
(D. Conn. 1998); AT & T Wireless Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Orange County, 982 F. Supp. 856,
860 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
123. 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).
124. Id. at 14.
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no matter what the carrier does, they may amount to a ban 'in effect'
even though substantial evidence will almost certainly exist for the
denial." 2
The Second Circuit propounded an "effects" test, in Sprint Spectrum,
L.P. v. Willoth, 126 that stressed whether governmental acts constituted a
refusal to permit service in a particular part of the municipality.
27
[T]he plain focus of the statute is on whether it is possible for a
user in a given remote location to reach a facility that can
establish connections to the national telephone network .... In
other words, local governments must allow service providers to
fill gaps in the ability of wireless telephones to have access to
land-lines ....
A local government may reject an application for
construction of a wireless service facility in an under-served
area without thereby prohibiting personal wireless services if
the service gap can be closed by less intrusive means."'
However, Willoth added that holes in coverage that are "very limited in
number or size" are treated as "de minimis."'29
While the foregoing seemed sufficient to establish the contours of
"gap" in terms of physical space, the Siting Policy is concerned with gaps
in wireless service. Courts are split on whether "gap," in this context,
means "gap in receiving service" or "gap in providing service." 3° Some,
including the Third Circuit, have examined the gap from the customer's• 131 12
perspective. The First Circuit has taken the provider's perspective.1
2
Courts also are split on whether to take the perspective of the customer
who otherwise would not be provided with a given technology.
133
125. Id.
126. 176 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999).
127. See APT Pittsburgh L.P. v. Penn Township Butler County, 196 F.3d 469, 478-79
(3d Cir. 1999); Willoth, 176 F.3d at 639, 641-43; Town of Amherst, 173 F.3d at 14.
128. Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643.
129. Id. at 643-44 (giving as illustrations "the interiors of buildings in a sparsely
populated rural area, or confined to a limited number of houses or spots as the area
covered by buildings increases").
130. Indep. Wireless One Corp. v. Town of Charlotte, 242 F. Supp. 2d 409, 417-20 (D.
Vt. 2003).
131. Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity Township, 282 F.3d 257, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2002); SiteTech
Group, Ltd. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 140 F. Supp. 2d 255,257 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
132. Second Generation Props., LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 634 (1st Cir.
2002).
133. PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Auth., 957 F. Supp. 1230, 1238 (D.N.M.
1997) (holding denial of permit to only provider of digital technology in specified area to
constitute a prohibition where customers otherwise limited to analog service only); see
also Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1468 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
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In VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County,3 the Seventh
Circuit held that the applicant failed to meet its "heavy burden" of
establishing that its proposal to build a 185-foot tower in a scenic river
district was the only feasible plan for closing a gap in its coverage."'
Although the county suggested several alternatives to the proposed site,
the applicant did not investigate thoroughly the viability of the
alternatives. 
136
This does not mean, however, that the potential availability of
"alternative sites" which are neither actually available nor technically
feasible will defeat an effective prohibition claim. In Nextel
Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Town of Sudbury,"' the
court concluded that the town "was in fact unwilling to issue [permits] for
the only other sites which would conceivably have met Nextel's coverage
needs without requiring zoning relief., 138 Unwillingness or hostility has
factored in other prohibition cases as well. 3 9 The gravamen of these
cases is ostensible cooperation masking prohibition. The First Circuit
observed in National Tower, LLC v. PlainviUle Zoning Board of
Appeals'40 that "[s]etting out criteria under the zoning law that no one
could ever meet is an example of an effective prohibition. ,141
While localities may not regulate so as to prohibit wireless
communications service, they have no affirmative duty to lease municipal
property for wireless communications towers, even if there is no practical
alternative site. Propriety refusals to lease do not constitute regulatory
or zoning prohibitions. 2
4. "Reasonable Period" for Consideration of Applications
The TCA provides that facilities siting requests must be acted upon
"within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed with
such government or instrumentality, taking into account the nature and
But see Iowa Wireless Servs., L.P. v. City of Moline, 29 F. Supp. 2d 915, 923 (C.D. I11.
1998).
134. 342 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2003).
135. Id. at 835.
136, Id.
137. No. Civ.A. 01-11754-DPW, 2003 WL 543383 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2003).
138. Id. at *13 (noting statements by local officials that "the Selectmen see no need or
desire to issue any more [permits]").
139. See, e.g., Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. v. Town of Westford, 206 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172
(D. Mass. 2002) (noting that "fixed hostility" of Board suggests that further applications
would be futile).
140. 297 F.3d 14 (lst Cir. 2002).
141. Id. at 23.
142. Omnipoint Communications Enters., L.P. v. Township of Nether Providence, 232
F. Supp. 2d 430, 435 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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scope of such request."'43 In Omnipoint, the First Circuit chastised the
locality that it must "face reality" and refrain from demanding and
rejecting successive applications without enunciating a clear indication of
its expectations.'4 "While prepared to tolerate some delay, Congress
made clear in two different provisions that it expected expeditious
resolution both by the local authorities and by courts called upon to
enforce the federal limitations.
1 45
5. Denials Shall Be in Writing
The requirement of section 704 that the denial of a permit request
"shall be in writing' ' 146 seems clear cut. Yet, even here there are
complications. First, there is the problem of defining a permit "request."
In order to be entitled to the benefits of this provision, the applicant
must have "supported its permit application with a 'certain minimal
amount of information. -147
More fundamentally, in Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems v. Todd,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered the scope of
judicial review with reference to the required written denial.1 49  The
opinion noted that "[s]ome courts have required that local authorities
issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.' '150  On the other
hand, some courts had found a written record of the meeting and a note
that the application had been "denied" to suffice.' The First Circuit
found that "[b]oth of these approaches seem flawed."'52 Todd held that
143. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2000).
144. 173 F.3d 9, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1999).
145. Id. at 17 n.8 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), (v); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
458, at 209 (1996)).
146. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2000).
147. SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 112 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D.
Conn. 2000) (quoting Omnipoint Communications Enters. v. Town of Amherst, 74 F.
Supp. 2d 109, 122 (D.N.H. 1998)).
148. 244 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2001). In an extensive analysis, the Sixth Circuit found Todd
"persuasive." New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2002).
149. Todd, 244 F.3d at 59.
150. Id. (citing, inter alia, Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 995 F. Supp.
52, 56 (D. Conn. 1998) (citing AT & T Wireless Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Orange County, 982
F. Supp. 856, 859 (M.D. Fla. 1997))).
151. Id. (citing AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir.
1998); AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 F.3d
307, 312-13 (4th Cir. 1999)).
152. Id. A noted regulatory takings lawyer has referred to such an analysis as "a
Goldilocks and the Three Bears sort of critique." Michael M. Berger, Recent Takings and
Eminent Domain Cases, in 1 LAND USE INSTITUTE: PLANNING, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND
COMPENSATION 221, 230 (1994) (emphasis added), available at WESTLAW, C930 ALI-
ABA 221.
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the Siting Policy "merely requires a written decision, in contrast to the
Administrative Procedures Act and other sections of the TCA that




Furthermore, "[plassage of the TCA did not alter the reality that the
local boards that administer the zoning laws are primarily staffed by
laypeople. Though their decisions are now subject to review under the
TCA, it is not realistic to expect highly detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law., 15 4 Yet issuance of a denial giving "no reasons for a
decision" coupled with the written record might be confusing, especially
when the record contains assertions that might be attributable to the• • •151
board or only to individual members.
The TCA distinguishes between a written denial and a written
record, thus indicating that the record cannot be a substitute for
a separate denial.
We conclude, therefore, that the TCA requires local boards
to issue a written denial separate from the written record. That
written denial must contain a sufficient explanation of the
reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing court to
evaluate the evidence in the record supporting those reasons.
We stress, however, that a meaningful review of the decision is
not limited, as Southwestern Bell would have it, only to the
facts specifically offered in the written decision. Again, such a
requirement would place an unjustified premium on the ability




Todd leaves open two important questions. The first is why the dual
requirements for a written denial and a written record preclude their
incorporation into a single document. Second, what if the written denial
contained no clear statement of reasons, but simply incorporated the
written record that did contain a clear statement of reasons? Under
these facts, a district court within the First Circuit held, in Nextel, that
"[t]o reject the ZBA's procedures on this ground would be a victory of
form over substance.,
157
6. "Supported by Substantial Evidence"
The most substantive aspect of the Siting Policy is the requirement that
denials of permit requests shall be "supported by substantial evidence
contained in a written record."' As the Eleventh Circuit noted in
153. Todd, 244 F.3d at 59.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 60.
156. Id. (citation omitted).
157. No. Civ.A. 01-11754-DPW, 2003 WL 543383 at *10 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2003).
158. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2000).
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Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County,15 9 while section 704 "does not
statutorily define the term 'substantial evidence,"' the House-Senate
Conference Committee expressly noted that it is meant to be "'the
traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions."'' 6 But
what standard is that?
"Judicial review of agency actions" most directly brings to mind
actions of administrative agencies, hence administrative law. Applying
the inference that Congress intends to use undefined terms of art in their
established meaning,161 many courts have presumed that Congress
intended "substantial evidence" to "track" the meaning of that term
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).'62 The APA requires
review for "substantial evidence" in cases of adjudications and formal
rulemaking by federal agencies. Under this approach, "[d]enials of
siting requests are subject to judicial oversight at a higher level of
scrutiny than standard local zoning decisions in order to determine
whether the denials were supported by substantial evidence."
1''
Traditionally, the federal courts have taken an extremely
deferential stance in reviewing local zoning decisions, limiting
the scope of inquiry to the constitutionality of the zoning
decision under a standard of rational review. Although
Congress explicitly preserved local zoning authority in all other
respects over the siting of wireless facilities ... the method by
which siting decisions are made is now subject to judicial
oversight. Therefore, denials subject to the TCA are reviewed
by this court more closely than standard local zoning decisions.
Here, the issue is whether the denials were supported by
substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence . . . mean[s] less than a
preponderance, but more than a scintilla of evidence. "It means
159. 296 F.3d 1210, 1218 (lth Cir. 2002).
160. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223).
161. Id. (citing McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991) (analyzing
"seaman," undefined in the Jones Act)).
162. Voice Stream PCS I, LLC v. City of Hillsboro, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1256 (D. Or.
2004).
163. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2000); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37 n.79 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
164. SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 112 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D.
Conn. 2000) (citing Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.
1999)).
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such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.'
6 5
Among the U.S. courts of appeals adopting an APA analysis are those
for the First,166 Second, 16 Third,168 and Sixth 169 Circuits. Also employing
this standard, the Eleventh Circuit noted in Preferred Sites that
"'[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. '" 170  Furthermore, "[a]lthough the 'substantial
evidence' standard is not as stringent as the preponderance of the
evidence standard, it requires courts to take a harder look than when
reviewing under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 1 71 In evaluating
whether the standard is met, "a court should view the record in its
entirety, including evidence unfavorable to the state or local
government's decision.',
2
Another approach is that embodied in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City
Council.'7 3 The wireless provider and a church claimed that the denial of
a conditional use permit to construct two 135-foot towers on church land
in a heavily forested residential area violated the Siting Policy. 174 The
planning commission unanimously (with one abstention) voted to
recommend approval of the permit after hearings, but the city council
received a petition against it from 700 landowners and unanimously
turned it down.' The Fourth Circuit held that the U.S. district court had
been in error when it concluded that the city council's decision must
include "findings of fact and an explanation of the decision.' ' 76 While the
Siting Policy demanded that decisions be in writing, that "cannot
reasonably be inflated into a requirement of a 'statement of ... findings
165. Cellular Tel., 166 F.3d at 493-94 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)) (citations omitted).
166. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2001).
167. Cellular Tel., 166 F.3d at 494.
168. Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 181 F.3d 403, 407-08 (3d Cir. 1999).
169. Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 227 F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir. 2000).
170. Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
171. Id. (citing Color Pigments Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th
Cir. 1994)).
172. Id. (citing Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981)).
173. 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
174. Id. at 424.
175. Id. at 425; see supra text accompanying note 72.
176. A IT & T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 429.
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and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor,"' as the explicit
requirements of the APA dictate.
77
More fundamentally, however, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the
substantive view that the city council should be held to the same standard
as an administrative agency. Instead, it adopted a "reasonable legislator"
test:
The Virginia Beach City Council is a state legislative body,
not a federal administrative agency. The "reasonable mind" of
a legislator is not necessarily the same as the "reasonable mind"
of a bureaucrat, and one should keep the distinction in mind
when attempting to impose the "substantial evidence" standard
onto the world of legislative decisions. It is not only proper but
even expected that a legislature and its members will consider
the views of their constituents to be particularly compelling forms
of evidence, in zoning as in all other legislative matters. These
views, if widely shared, will often trump those of bureaucrats or
experts in the minds of reasonable legislators.
In light of these principles, the City Council's decision clearly
does not violate the "substantial evidence" requirement. ...
Appellees correctly point out that both the Planning
Department and the Planning Commission recommended
approval. In addition, appellees of course had numerous
experts touting both the necessity and the minimal impact of
towers at the Church. Such evidence surely would have
justified a reasonable legislator in voting to approve the
application, and may even amount to a preponderance of the
evidence in favor of the application, but the repeated and
widespread opposition of a majority of the citizens of Virginia
Beach who voiced their views-at the Planning Commission
hearing, through petitions, through letters, and at the City
Council meeting-amounts to far more than a "mere scintilla"
of evidence to persuade a reasonable mind to oppose the
application. Indeed, we should wonder at a legislator who
ignored such opposition. In all cases of this sort, those seeking
to build will come armed with exhibits, experts, and evaluations.
Appellees, by urging us to hold that such a predictable barrage
mandates that local governments approve applications,
effectively demand that we interpret the Act so as always to
thwart average, nonexpert citizens; that is, to thwart democracy.
The district court dismissed citizen opposition as "generalized
concerns." Congress, in refusing to abolish local authority over
177. Id. at 429-30 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)).
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zoning of personal wireless services, categorically rejected this
scornful approach. 178
Going beyond the Fourth Circuit preference for local autonomy, Judge
Paul Niemeyer's opinion in Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Board of
Supervisors'79 asserted that the Siting Policy "substantial evidence" test
violates the Tenth Amendment.' 8° Judge Niemeyer noted that the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution'8 ' requires state courts to
apply federal law.' 2 "But the requirement that state courts apply federal
law is materially different from the proposition that state zoning boards
use federally mandated standards in their legislative processes.',
8 3
Furthermore, "the imposition of a federal standard on a local board
confuses the electorate as to which governmental unit, federal or local, is
to be accountable for a legislative decision made by the local board."'
84
The Fourth Circuit view might dispel at least some of the concern of
those commentators who thought that the Siting Policy might subsume
all local autonomy.15
While the Fourth Circuit test and Judge Niemeyer's opinion stress
local legislative autonomy, courts applying the APA "substantial
evidence" test presume that local land use regulation is a quasi-judicial
function. The Third Circuit quoted the Fourth Circuit's A T & T Wireless
language celebrating legislative autonomy in Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning
Hearing Board of Pine Grove Township."" It continued by quoting
approvingly from the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Aegerter v. City of
Delafield"' which, the Third Circuit said, "characterized zoning permit
178. Id. at 430-31 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
179. 205 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 2000).
180. Id. at 699-705.
181. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
182. 205 F.3d at 704.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 700.
185. See, e.g., Matthew N. McClure, Working Through the Static: Is There Anything
Left to Local Control in the Siting of Cellular and PCS Towers After the
Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 44 VILL. L. REv. 781, 786 (1999).
186. 181 F.3d 403, 408 (3d Cir. 1999). The quoted language is as follows:
The Virginia Beach City Council is a state legislative body, not a federal
administrative agency . . . . It is not only proper but even expected that a
legislature and its members will consider the views of their constituents to be
particularly compelling forms of evidence, in zoning as in all other legislative
matters. These views, if widely shared, will often trump those of bureaucrats or
experts in the minds of reasonable legislators.
Id. (omission in original) (quoting AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d
423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998)). For a longer excerpt, see supra text accompanying note 178.
187. 174 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 1999).
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decisions as primarily administrative in nature."1 8 The Seventh Circuit
had declared:
[T]rue as the AT & T Wireless observation may be about
legislators, it overlooks the fact that municipal councils often
wear several hats when they act. When they are passing
ordinances or other laws, they are without a doubt legislators,
but when they sit as an administrative body making decisions
about zoning permits, they are like any other agency the state
has created. We therefore apply the conventional substantial
189
evidence standard to the case before us.
For land use aficionados, the debate as to whether the authorization of
wireless communications towers by local legislatures is quasi-judicial or
legislative in nature is but one reflection of the controversy concerning
the standards by which small-scale rezoning of any sort is to be
adjudicated. Insofar as the U.S. Constitution is concerned, the
comprehensive zoning of a community has been legislative in nature, and
thus entitled to deference, since the seminal case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.'9° On the other extreme, the exaction of property in
exchange for the issuance of development permits by local administrative
agencies is subject to the requirement that the exaction be imposed upon
an "individualized determination" that it is "'roughly proportional"' to
the burden that would be imposed by the new land use.1 9 The Supreme
Court has shied away from imposing the same test on local legislative
determinations, although it is not clear if there is any basis for a
distinction between administrative and legislative determinations for
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause purposes.92 There is state precedent
that legislative small-scale exactions violate the Takings Clause.1 93
The states, for the most part, have deemed all zoning, even small-scale
rezoning, to be a legislative function.9 However, some states, primarily
out of a concern for the abuses generally associated with "spot zoning,"
treat small-scale land use planning enactments as "quasi-judicial" or
188. Omnipoint, 181 F.3d at 408.
189. Aegerter, 174 F.3d at 890.
190. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
191. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,388-91 (1994).
192. See Parking Ass'n of Ga. Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117-18 (1995)
(mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
193. Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 391-92 (111. App. Ct.
1995).
194. See, e.g., Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980);
Mahoney v. O'Shea Funeral Homes, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 297 (N.Y. 1978).
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"administrative" under some circumstances. In Fasano v. Board of
Commissioners,1 95 the Supreme Court of Oregon declared:
[W]e feel we would be ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning
decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts to be
accorded a full presumption of validity and shielded from less
than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of
powers. Local and small decision groups are simply not the
equivalent in all respects of state and national legislatures.
There is a growing judicial recognition of this fact of life:
'It is not a part of the legislative function to
grant permits, make special exceptions, or decide
particular cases. Such activities are not legislative but
administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial in character.
To place them in the hands of legislative bodies, whose
acts as such are not judicially reviewable, is to open the
door completely to arbitrary government.'
196
Interestingly, even precedent within a given state might be torn
between the desire to protect the almost-plenary authority on land use
matters accorded local legislatures, on the one hand, and the graft and
abuse often associated with spot zoning on the other. Virginia is a case in
point. The Fourth Circuit, in establishing its "reasonable legislator" rule
in AT & T Wireless, stressed the importance of the legislative function.
Similarly, in his Petersburg Cellular opinion, Judge Niemeyer quoted the
1975 Virginia Supreme Court decision City of Richmond v. Randall,97
which the Virginia Court subsequently reaffirmed,' stressing that "the
courts have 'no power to rezone land to any classification or to order a
legislative body to do so. ' ' 99 At the very same time, there is a clear line
of cases in Virginia prohibiting local legislatures from engaging in small-
scale rezoning unless there is a demonstrable mistake in the original
comprehensive zoning or a change in circumstances. 2°°
"With respect to the validity of a piecemeal downzoning
ordinance such as that here involved, we are of opinion that
when an aggrieved landowner makes a prima facie showing that
since enactment of the prior ordinance there has been no change
195. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), overruled on other grounds by Neuberger v. City of
Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980).
196. Id. at 26 (quoting Ward v. Vill. of Skokie, 186 N.E.2d 529, 533 (1962) (Klinybiel,
J., concurring)).
197. 211 S.E.2d 56 (Va. 1975).
198. Tran v. Gwinn, 554 S.E.2d 63, 69 (Va. 2001) (citing Randall, 211 S.E.2d at 61 n.3).
199. Petersburg Cellular P'ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 685, 700 (4th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Randall, 211 S.E.2d at 61).
200. See, e.g., Seabrooke Partners v. City of Chesapeake, 393 S.E.2d 191 (Va. 1990).
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in circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety,
or welfare, the burden of going forward with evidence of such
mistake, fraud, or changed circumstances shifts to the governing
body. If the governing body produces evidence sufficient to
make reasonableness fairly debatable, the ordinance must be
sustained. If not, the ordinance is unreasonable and void."2 °1
The import of these Virginia cases is that comprehensive zoning is the
prerogative of the local legislature, whereas small-scale rezoning, often
condemned as "spot zoning," will be more carefully reviewed by the
courts. In a sense, the problem elucidated in Judge Niemeyer's opinion
in Petersburg Cellular, asserting that the TCA "substantial evidence" test
202violates the Tenth Amendment, is not unlike that wrestled with by
some courts as to whether to apply the Fasano distinction, permitting
legislatures to act as legislatures most of the time, but insisting that they
act as administrative tribunals at other times.2 n
The judicial split over the "substantial evidence" test is emblematic of
the recursive character of the TCA siting provisions. Those circuits
favoring the APA position have said that "'[s]ubstantial evidence' review
under the TCA does not create a substantive federal limitation upon
local land use regulatory power."' 5 Likewise, the substantive standard,
to which the "substantial evidence" inquiry is directed, is taken from
"'established principles of state and local law."' 2 6 Thus, federal law
specifies the degree or quantum of evidence needed to legitimize, under
federal law, the exercise of legislative powers devolved upon local
boards, under state law, to enforce substantive rights established by state
law.
The application of the APA test to section 704 has been criticized
because its preference for formal fact finding and objective evidence
"prevents a [local] board from balancing properly a proposed tower's
potential harm and the utility of improved wireless service[s]. 20 7  In
201. Turner v. Bd. of County Supervisors, 559 S.E.2d 683, 687 (Va. 2002) (quoting Bd.
of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (Va. 1974)).
202. Petersburg Cellular, 205 F.3d at 699-705.
203. See supra text accompanying note 196.
204. See, e.g., Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997); Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
205. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2001).
206. Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 24 F. Supp. 2d 359, 366 (D.N.J.
1998))).
207. Christopher P. Terry, On the Frontiers of Knowledge: A Flexible Substantial
Evidence Standard of Review for Zoning Board Tower Siting Decisions, 20 TEMP. ENvTrL.
L. & TECH. J. 147, 156 (2002).
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addition to "[ajesthetics and potential effects on property values ... not
[being] easily reducible to empirical data," it is argued, "courts applying
the APA test preclude a board from relying on residents' opinions in
deciding whether to grant a tower siting permit. ' 2 8
The notion that the data of experts was to be preferred over the
feelings of people was rejected by the Fourth Circuit in AT & T Wireless
PCS v. City Council)° "Congress, in refusing to abolish local authority
over zoning of personal wireless services, categorically rejected this
scornful approach."21
More broadly, the concern that data unfairly overcomes intuitions
permeates the controversy over the employment of cost-benefit analysis,
which has become a standard tool for discerning the efficacy of
regulatory policy. t ' Some assert that the methodology of cost-benefit
analysis is flawed because of problems involving: the incommensurability
of different values; consequentialist ethics; appropriate discount rates (if
any) for future enjoyment of resources; distributional issues, which
center around whether willingness to pay is the appropriate proxy of
demand; and measurement errors.1 2 With respect to the environment,
often raised in the tower siting context, deep ecologists have rejected the
use of cost-benefit analysis in toto.
211
Assertions about environmental values and the value of the
environment are expressed with considerable conviction. Aesthetic and
other claims based on the enjoyment of nature by present and future
214
generations are not falsifiable, hence not scientific in nature, and hence
not amenable to rigorous judicial review. That notwithstanding, courts
applying the APA approach have vindicated aesthetic objections to
tower siting, even when the objections are not supported by declines in
208. Id.
209. AT & T Wireless PCS v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating
that legislators should "consider the views of their constituents to be particularly
compelling forms of evidence").
210. Id. at 431.
211. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative
Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1344-46, 1348
(2002) (discussing the growth of cost-benefit analysis).
212. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 77, 77-83 (Matthew D. Alder & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001)
(discussing criticisms of cost-benefit analysis).
213. Edwin R. McCullough, Through the Eye of a Needle: The Earth's Hard Passage
Back to Health, 10(2) J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 389, 436-37 (1995) ("[I]f access to nature is a
right, then cost-benefit analysis breaks down. In other words, there is no amount of
money which can compensate for irreversible and irreparable damage to nature.").
214. See KARL R. POPPER, Science: Conjectures and Refittations, in CONJECTURES
AND REFUTATIONS 33, 33-59 (Harper & Row 1968) (1962).
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market value." It is sufficient that the decision seems grounded in
objections to the particular tower."' On the other hand, courts have not
been supportive of articulated negative views about towers in general or
views that evidenced a misunderstanding of what the tower actually
would look like.21 7 Nor have the courts supported aesthetic objections
that were demonstrably without substance.2 8
7. No Regulation Based on "Radio Frequency Emissions"
The Siting Policy prohibits states and localities from denying wireless
tower siting permits for environmental reasons based on radio frequency
emissions that comply with FCC standards. 2 9 The Siting Policy therefore
precludes "health concerns from radio emissions. ' 20 Furthermore, local
attempts to regulate the "operation" of wireless communications towers,
based on emissions considerations, also are reasonably interpreted by the
211FCC to fall under the same prohibition. While the Siting Policy
emissions provision mentions "placement, construction, and
modification," but not operations, it is only in the area of "placement,
construction, and modification" that the TCA makes an exception to its
22general preference for plenary FCC rulemaking. However, a public
entity can refuse to license or otherwise permit the construction of a
223communications tower on its own property based on health concerns.The denial then would be proprietary rather than regulatory in nature.2
215. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58, 61 (1st Cir.
2001) (detailing the First Circuit's APA approach and holding that the TCA does not
prevent local authorities from basing development decisions on aesthetics).
216. See, e.g., id at 61.
217. See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 495-96 (2d Cir.
1999).
218. See Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 181 F.3d 403, 405-06, 409 (3d Cir.
1999) (noting that 114-foot tower was surrounded by eighty to ninety-foot tall trees and
would only be visible to neighbors 600 feet away).
219. 47 U.S.C. § 322(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2000). "No State or local government or
instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, construction, and modification of
personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio
frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's
regulations concerning such emissions." Id.
220. AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423,431 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998).
221. Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837. 843 n.11, 844 (1984)
(applying the required deferential review of agency construction of a statute that the
agency is charged with administrating).
222. Id. at 96.
223. See Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.3d 404, 420-21 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding a
lease agreement in which a school district required Sprint to abide by emission standards
stricter than the FCC's standards in order to place a tower on a school's roof).
224. See id. at 420-21.
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8. Expedited Review and Relief
Section 704 provides that persons directly affected by state or local
wireless tower permitting decisions, or failures to act, may seek
expedited review in federal or state court.225 It has been interpreted to
vest U.S. district courts "'with sufficient authority to grant ... mandamus
relief if such relief is warranted under the circumstances.' ' '226 In light of
the requirement for such expedition, courts finding for the
telecommunications provider generally order the issuance of the
requested permit rather than remand for additional proceedings. Such a
remand "would simply further delay resolution of the issue. '227 There is
a substantial split among the courts as to whether landowners and
wireless providers may seek relief under the Federal Civil Rights Act (42
U.S.C. § 1983).22- However, the TCA's provision of a right of action for
wireless telephone providers denied permission to locate transmission
towers in desired locations did not provide a right of action to persons
229aggrieved by a decision to allow towers.
C. Should the Williamson County Ripeness Rules Apply to Section 704
Cases?
1. The Supreme Court's Williamson County Test
In the seminal case of Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank,230 the Supreme Court reviewed the claim
225. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (2000). The statute states:
(v) Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a
State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with
this subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act,
commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear
and decide such action on an expedited basis. Any person adversely affected by
an act or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality
thereof that is inconsistent with clause (iv) [environmental effects of radio
frequency omissions] may petition the Commission for relief.
Id.
226. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1463 (N.D. Ala.
1997) (quoting Bellsouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnelt County, 944 F. Supp. 923, 929 (N.D.
Ga. 1996)).
227. Primeco Pers. Communications, L.P. v. City of Mequon, 242 F. Supp. 2d 567, 582
(E.D. Wis. 2003).
228. See, e.g., id. at 580-81 (no); Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1305,
1314-16 (D.N.M. 2002) (no); Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 175
F. Supp. 2d 697, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (yes); SBA Communications Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n,
164 F. Supp. 2d 280, 294-95 (D. Conn. 2001) (yes).
229. Mason v. O'Brien, No. 1:01-CV-1556, 2002 WL 31972190, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2002).
230. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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that denial of permits for residential development constituted a taking
for which just compensation was required under the Fifth Amendment.21
The Court held that the developer "has not shown that the [state] inverse
condemnation procedure is unavailable or inadequate, and until it has
utilized that procedure, its taking claim is premature.,
232
The result of Williamson County has been that regulatory takings cases
are subject to "a special ripeness doctrine applicable only to
constitutional property rights claims., 233 The Williamson County test has
two prongs. The first provides that "a claim that the application of
government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe
until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations
has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations
to the property at issue. 2 4 The second prong requires that the owner
seek just compensation in state courtsY
2. Should Williamson County Apply to TCA Determinations?
Section 704 explicitly provides that aggrieved parties can challenge
state and local wireless communications tower siting determinations in
236federal court. Thus, it might seem that Williamson County is not a bar
to federal judicial review. However, the right to sue is triggered by a
"final action or failure to act." 2" Therefore, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit recently determined in Sprint Spectrum L.P. v.
City of Carmel23t that the "final decision" prong of Williamson County is
239applicable to TCA siting challenges.
In one sense, it is no surprise that the Seventh Circuit's Carmel opinion
discerns "no significant difference" between the evolution of the
regulatory takings ripeness doctrine in Williamson County and its
progeny and the application of the doctrine to telecommunications tower
siting. As the court noted, Seventh Circuit precedent indeed has "read
Williamson broadly,''240 excepting from its purview only land use cases
having equal protection claims involving fundamental rights, a suspect
231. Id. at 175 & n.1; U.S, CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation").
232. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197.
233. Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of
Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992).
234. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186.
235. Id. at 194-95. The owner must "seek compensation through the procedures the
State has provided for doing so." Id. at 194.
236. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (2000).
237. Id.
238. 361 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2004).
239. Id. at 1004.
240. Id. at 1002 (quoting Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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class, or demonstrated governmental conduct impossible to reconcile
with legitimate objectives.14' Emblematic of its approach was the brush-
off of one owner's claim that land use regulations violated the
Fourteenth Amendment with the sentence: "This case presents a garden-
variety zoning dispute dressed up in the trappings of constitutional
law."242
Sprint, a national provider of wireless telephone services, sought to
improve its service in the Indianapolis area by leasing the right to place
an antenna on the land of Dr. Edwin Zamber, a city resident.241 "Carmel
is just a stone's throw north of Indianapolis, and Zamber already had an
existing 135-foot-high ham radio tower on his property which met
Sprint's technical criteria."244 Sprint received an improvement location
permit from Carmel, allowing it to install low-profile antennae on the
sides of Zamber's tower and to construct a ground-level equipment
shelter.2" A neighbor objected and Carmel revoked the permit on the
grounds that the access road that Sprint was installing required an access
easement and subdivision and primary plat amendments.24 After a state
court found Sprint's subdivision appeal timely, and after holding multiple
hearings, the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) determined that a
commercial antenna was not a permitted use in the residential district
and that Sprint would have to obtain a special use permit as well as
subdivision plat approval from the Plan Commission.247 Sprint then
sought mandamus and other relief in federal court claiming, inter alia,
that the BZA's actions violated the Siting Policy since they were not
supported by substantial evidence and unreasonably discriminated
against Sprint.24' The trial court, noting that Sprint still could apply for a
special use permit, dismissed the case under the "final decision" rule of
Williamson County.249
The Seventh Circuit began by noting that Carmel concerned one
section 704 issue:
[W]hen is a land use decision a "final action" in order to create
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, we must
241. Id.
242. Coniston Corp. v. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that government rejection of an owner's site plan does not constitute deprivation
of substantive or procedural due process).






249. Id. at 1001.
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examine whether the Act modifies the traditional analysis,
enunciated in Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, for determining when a
complaint challenging a local land use decision is ripe for
federal adjudication.
Section 704 provides that "an action can be brought in 'any court of
competent jurisdiction' by '[a]ny person adversely affected by any final
action or failure by a State or local government or any instrumentality
thereof that is inconsistent with [§332(c)(7)]." '25' The court added that
"[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress
intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific."...
... [TIhe existence of a case and controversy is a prerequisite
for the exercise of federal judicial power [and that the ripeness]
doctrine's basic rationale "is to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative
policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the
challenging parties."
Based on these principles, the Supreme Court has adopted
[the Williamson County] specific ripeness requirements for
cases challenging land use decisions....
Noticeably, . . . with regard to challenges to land use
decisions, "[t]his Circuit has read Williamson broadly ..... ...
... [W]e see no significant difference simply because Sprint's
252claim arises from a statute rather than the Constitution.
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the Williamson County ripeness
rules are not the "more general" ripeness standards, nor are they the
same as the specific ripeness standards specified by other statutes.253 It
grounded its decision to use the Williamson County rules in the TCA's
statutory provisions and legislative intent.
[A]lthough creating a federal cause of action, Congress
explicitly ensured that the Act would not intrude upon the
traditional authority of local governments over land use
matters. As codified, § 332(c)(7) is entitled "Preservation of
250. Id. at 1000 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
251. Id. at 1001 (alteration in original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)).
252. Id, at 1001, 1002, 1003 (first and fifth alterations and fifth omission in original)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
253. Id. at 1003.
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local zoning authority." That section expressly states that
"[e]xcept as provided in this paragraph, nothing in [the] Act
shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government
or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless
service facilities.,
254
The court then noted that the original House provision would have
allowed the FCC total authority over tower siting, but that the final bill,
as the Conference Committee explained, "preserves the authority of
State and local governments over zoning and land use matters except in
the limited circumstances set forth in the conference agreement.,
25
Furthermore, the Conference Committee's report defined "'final action"
as meaning "'final administrative action at the State or local government
level so that a party can commence action under the [Act] rather than
waiting for the exhaustion of any independent State court remedy
otherwise required.'
256
Sprint asserted that reading Williamson County into the TCA "would
create too many time-consuming procedural hurdles," thus defeating the
Act's intent of encouraging the "rapid deployment" of wireless
communications. This intent is furthered by three other provisions of
the Act: that local authorities act on siting requests within a "reasonable
period of time,"258 that providers must file claims under the Act within
thirty days,21' and that the federal courts hear such claims on an
expedited basis. 60 Based on these provisions, Sprint urged that the
TCA's requirement for "final action" requires only that the service
provider "obtain a definitive ruling from the local government solely on
the issues presented to the local authorities.,
261
The court disagreed, based upon its conclusion that Congress "did not
intend to modify the traditional ripeness requirements for challenging
local land use decisions" embodied in Williamson County. The court
added that, while Williamson County requires that an owner "must
exhaust all available state remedies for compensation prior to bringing a
254. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
255. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 207 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 221-22).
256. Id. at 1004 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 9, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223).
257. Id. at 1003 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)).
258. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)).
259. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)).




taking claim to federal court,, 26 2 the Conference Committee interpreted
"final action" under the TCA siting provisions as meaning "'final
administrative action at the State or local government level so that a
party can commence action under the [Act] rather than waiting for the
exhaustion of any independent State court remedy otherwise
required.' 263 "This exercise," it added, "clearly teaches that Congress
was aware of Williamson County and knew how to modify its holding
when that is what it wanted to do.
264
The second (state compensation) prong of Williamson County requires
that the landowner litigate for compensation up through the state
265supreme court, if permitted to do so: The reason is that "if a State
provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the
property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation
Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just
compensation. The first (finality) prong of Williamson County
provides that "a claim that the application of government regulations
effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final
decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at
issue. '26' Although at least one state, California, requires judicial review
of administrative determinations for finality ripeness,' it is not clear if
that applies beyond inverse condemnation claims.
Read with this caveat in mind, the sparse language of the Conference
Committee report could mean either that (1) Congress was precluding
what generally would be the expansion of Williamson County to include
state litigation of local land use decisions as well as local denials of
compensation, or (2) that Congress was evincing its general concern that
local land use decisions be expedited. The failure of the Conference
Committee report to make explicit reference to Williamson County
suggests that the second interpretation is more accurate.
262. Id. at 1003-04 (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193-94 (1985)).
263. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. CONY. REP. No. 104-458, at 9 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223).
264. Id. at 1004.
265. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95 & n.13 (1985); id. at 194 n.13 ("A second
reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation
through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.").
266. Id. at 195.
267. Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
268. Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043, 1047 (Cal. 1994).
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3. The Convolution of Williamson County Subprongs
The invocation of the beguiling word "finality" masks a multitude of
complexities. First, it is not in the local land use regulator's interest to
give the "final" determination that would satisfy the Williamson County
finality requirement. As Justice Brennan noted in his seminal dissent in
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,6 9 regulators employ
delay as an administrative tool precisely to thwart development. °
Second, given the multitude of incommensurate variables that enter into
a planning decision, the very concept of a "final" determination that a
specified quantity of development would be allowed is alien to the
planning process:
What is supposedly needed is a "final" determination of what
the regulator will allow the property owner to do on his land.
As most planners will tell you, however, that is not a planner's
job. The planner's job is to draw an abstract plan and then
determine whether a specific development proposal meets its
requirements. Anyone who thinks that he can get a planning
agency to formally tell him what he CAN do on his land simply
211
doesn't understand the planning process.
Furthermore, in the face of the reluctance of officials to issue "final
272
denials" in place of invitations to try and try again, attempts to make
operational the fuzzy concept of "finality" have become increasingly
convoluted. In fact, in spite of its use of the term "premature" in
Williamson County,273 the Supreme Court has never definitively ruled
that there is a right, after state adjudication, to federal review of Fifth
214
Amendment takings claims. Furthermore, the courts of appeals are
divided as to whether the act of "ripening" a claim in state court itself
269. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
270. Id. at 655 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that city attorneys were advised at
a training program that, "IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE
REGULATIONAND START OVER AGAIN").
271. Michael M. Berger, Vindicating the Rights of Private Land Development in the
Courts, 32 URB. LAW. 941, 954 (2000).
272. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 655 n.22 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
273. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197
(1985).
274. See, e.g., Rainey Bros. Constr. Co. v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of
Adjustment, 528 U.S. 871 (1999) (denying certiorari on this issue, although petition filed
by leading advocates for both landowners and municipalities); see also Rainey Bros.
Constr. v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment., No. 97-5897, t999 WL 220128,
at *1, *3 (6th Cir. Ap. 5, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision).
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creates issue and claim preclusion so as to defeat any subsequent federal
judicial review.275 This issue now is before the Supreme Court.
7 6
A development application under Williamson County must be
"meaningful., 277 The year after Williamson County was decided the
Supreme Court, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo,
2 7
declared:
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an
essential prerequisite to its assertion is a final and authoritative
determination of the type and intensity of development legally
permitted on the subject property. A court cannot determine
whether a regulation has gone "too far" unless it knows how far
the regulation goes. 9
Referring to the developer's permit application, the Court added in
MacDonald that the "[rlejection of exceedingly grandiose development
plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive
similarly unfavorable reviews."'  "The implication is not that future
applications would be futile, but that a meaningful application has not
yet been made., 28' A wireless facilities siting application for a
conditional use, variance, or other permit might, similarly, be rejected on
the grounds that the tower is too tall, too stark in design, too close to
incompatible uses, or otherwise so blatantly violative of local norms so as
not to be "meaningful" under Williamson County and, hence, under the
Siting Policy. The ex ante effect of the "meaningful" application
requirement is that the applicant's first proposal often is treated as the
initial offer in a round of negotiations, and, necessarily, the applicant
must submit it with that knowledge.
Some courts have required that the owner apply for a variance under
all circumstances.2 2 This is not a procedure apt to prove fruitful to
275, Compare San Remo Hotel L.P. v. San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088, 1090, 1098-99
(9th Cir. 2004) (barring subsequent federal review), and Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 142 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998) (same), with Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste
Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2003) (permitting subsequent federal review), and
Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299 (l1th Cir. 1992) (same).
276. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 685
(2004) (granting certiorari on issue of "[i]s a Fifth Amendment Takings claim barred by
issue preclusion on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law, which was
rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to ripen the federal Takings claim,"
Brief for Petitioner at i, available at 2005 WL 176427).
277. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195 n.14.
278. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
279. Id. at 348.
280. Id. at 353 n.9.
281. Id. n.8.
282. See, e.g., Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872,
877 (9th Cir. 1987).
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applicants, however, since use variances require that the parcel be such
that any owner would suffer unique hardship without relief and also that
there would be no injury from the intended use to neighbors.
One defense from onerous demands for multiple applications is the
doctrine of "futility."'' The Supreme Court recently defined "futility" in
a practical sense in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,5  noting that "once ... the
permissible uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of
certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened."2' 6 Classic examples
of futility tend to involve bad faith as well. In City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,287 the city demanded five complete site
plans for a proposed development."8 Each time the landowner complied
with the city's articulated recommendations for change, the city refused
to take "yes" for an answer and piled on new demands. 89 The patent
incredulity with which the justices viewed the city's assurance that
matters were complicated and that all applicants were treated in the
manner as Del Monte Dunes undoubtedly played an important, if
unarticulated, role in the Court's upholding a substantial award for the
landowner.29
In Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises,
Inc.,291 the First Circuit chastised the locality that it must "face reality":
If the Board's position is that it can just sit back and deny all
applications, that position in the end could, if maintained, prove
fatal to the Board rather than Omnipoint. Under federal law,
the town can control the siting of facilities but-as several
Board members admitted-it cannot preclude wireless service
altogether. Nor, in the face of a vigilant district court, can the
283. See, e.g., Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1939).
284. See, e.g., Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1575 (11th Cir.
1989) (concluding that parties essentially agreed that property could not be developed
more extensively where city presented no evidence of development potential); Herrington
v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1495 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that preliminary ruling
effectively precluding development made further pursuit of application futile).
285. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
286. Id. at 620.
287. 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (requiring exhaustion of available postdeprivation remedies
under U.S. law).
288. Id. at 695-96.
289. Id. at 695-98.
290. During oral argument, counsel for petitioner, George A. Yuhas, stated, "This
case is not atypical in some respects. The city was faced with a complex decision it had to
reconcile competing interests, sift through facts, and exercise its discretion and judgment,
and it did so." Oral Argument at 4, Del Monte Dunes (No. 97-1235), available at 1998 WL
721087. Justice Scalia, referring to the number of complete applications the city required,
each imposing additional demands, responded, "Five times." Id.
291. 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).
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town exhaust applicants by requiring successive applications
without giving any clue of what will do the trick.292
4. The Williamson County Rule and Expedited Review
There is an extensive literature devoted to parsing the complexities of
the Williamson County rule 93 and to whether federal takings questions
should be decided in federal courts.294 According to Professor Daniel R.
Mandelker, "federal judges have distorted the Supreme Court's ripeness
precedents to achieve an undeserved and unwarranted result: they avoid
the vast majority of takings cases on their merits., 295 This provenance
makes the Williamson County doctrine notably problematic where a
statute mandates expedited review.
D. Evaluating the TCA Siting Provisions
The present TCA facilities siting provisions have led to "costly battles"
between unhappy neighbors and citizens groups on the one hand, and
landowners desirous of making beneficial utilization of their parcels and
296
wireless service providers on the other. The charge that the Siting
Policy "is vague in its reach and implications and serves as the source for
political, economic, and emotional turmoil for the wireless industry and
communities alike 2 97 does seem to be a "universal conclusion.,
298 These
292. Id. at 16-17.
293. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law
Reform: A View from the Trenches -A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate,
38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 855, 857-76 (1998); Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal
Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section
1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73, 77-83 (1988); Gregory Overstreet, The
Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far the
Federal Courts Will Go To Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 91, 94-98 (1994).
294. See, e.g., John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the
"Ripeness Mess"?: A Call for Reform so Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal
Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 201 (1999) (advocating congressional legislation easing the
rules for jurisdiction of takings claims); Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, A
Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE
L. & ZONING DIG. 3, 5 (1990) (arguing federal takings questions should be resolved in
federal courts).
295. Amendment to the Webb-Kenyon Act; and the Private Property Implementation
Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 1063 and H.R. 1534Before the Subcomm. on Courts &
Intellectual Prop. of Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 67 (1998) (statement of Daniel
Mandelker, Stamper Professor of Law, University of Washington).
296. Andrew B. Levy, Note, If Not Here, Where?: Wireless Facility Siting and Section
332(c)(7) of the Telecommunications Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 389, 392-93
(1999).
297. Hughes, supra note 14, at 474.
298. Levy, supra note 295, at 392.
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results flow from section 704's rhetorical attempt to have it both ways-
to bridge the gap between NIMBY concerns and telecommunications
infrastructure expansion with legislation that would have local rules and
practices regulated by federal procedural devices.
VI. BALANCING THE EQUITIES: NEW PRESUMPTIONS AND SAFE
HARBOR RULES
A. The Need for Legislative Reform
In large cities, there are a substantial number of tall structures upon or
in which wireless communications antennae could be constructed. The
local political landscape is varied as well, with the local legislature
comprised of members who represent the interests of varied
manufacturing, commercial, residential, and socioeconomic
constituencies. In typical suburbs, however, the landscape is flatter, and
the voting constituency consists almost entirely of homeowners who
perceive that their property values would be adversely affected by
cellular communications towers. Whether correct from any other
perspective, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's
observation about local legislators rings true as a political statement:
"[A] legislature and its members will consider the views of their
constituents to be particularly compelling forms of evidence, in zoning as
in all other legislative matters. These views, if widely shared, will often
trump those of bureaucrats or experts in the minds of reasonable
legislators. 2 99
It is realistic to assume that NIMBY pressures will continue, and that
they will retard the development of wireless communications services to
a certain extent. There does not appear to be the political will, nor
would it necessarily be advantageous, to have a comprehensively strict
and preemptive federal statute regulating the development of wireless
communications facilities. The failure to enact the House version of the
facility siting provisions confirms this conclusion. °
Two vehicles seem most promising for furthering the growth of
wireless telecommunications while protecting the interest of
neighborhood residents. First, industry officials should strive for
collocation of facilities and aesthetic design where practical. Local
political leaders should realize that the interests of their constituents
largely are aligned with broader goals of national commercial
development and security. It is true, as an industry attorney put it, that
299. AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423,430 (4th Cir. 1998).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 75-90.
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"both parties working together can solve many siting problems."
' 301
"Short of extremely unpopular legislation pre-empting local moratoria
against tower siting, only a cooperative effort by all parties will ensure
that all interests are protected. 3 °1 2 The American Planning Association,
among other groups, has done extensive work to try to locate such
solutions.3 3
Second, however, the siting provisions of the TCA are too vague,
confusing, and weak to be of much assistance.04n The challenge is to
devise amendments to the TCA that stop short of general preemption of
local land use regulation of wireless towers, but go beyond federal
controls that are procedural and that attempt to fasten themselves to the
adaptable rulemaking of sometimes recalcitrant local legislators.
B. Suggestions for Statutory Reform of the TCA Siting Provisions
1. Burden Shifting
As described earlier,3 °5 federal courts have split on whether the burden
of proof with respect to the TCA's limitations on local regulatory
authority3 6 falls upon the applicant or the municipality. A rule of
statutory interpretation is to define exceptions to the general rule
narrowly. While one might perceive the "limitations" provision of 47
U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) to be the exception to the "preservation of local
authority" provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), it is also true that the
"preservation of local authority" itself is carved out from the more
general provisions of the Communications Act .3  Section 332(c)(7)(B)
gives plenary authority to the FCC to regulate wireless
301. Hughes, supra note 14, at 500.
302. Id. at 471.
303. For a list of sources on explaining and complying with the TCA, see AM.
PLANNING ASS'N, AMENDING A TELECOMMUNICATIONS ORDINANCE, http://www.
planning.org/pas/telecommunications.htm (lasted visited Nov. 5, 2004).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 296-98.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 104-14.
306. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) (2000).
307. See, e.g., Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) ("In
construing provisions . . . in which a general statement of policy is qualified by an
exception, we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary
operation of the provision.").
308. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 254(f) (2000) ("A State may adopt regulations not
inconsistent with the [FCC's] rules to preserve and advance universal service.");
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 143 ("This Act and the
amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede
Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.").
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communications. In other words, being the exception to the exception,
the Siting Policy limitations on local authority reflect the general rule.
From a political and a practical perspective, Congress approached the
question of statutory siting provisions not as one of subordinating one set
of values to another, but rather one of harmonizing two conflicting sets
of societal values. One, encapsulated in the Commerce Clause10 and in
the authority of Congress to provide for homeland security,311 encourages
wireless infrastructure development. The other, encapsulated in the
concept of the Federal Government being one of enumerated powers
312and in the Tenth Amendment, respects local autonomy.
Given that state and local governments have wide latitude in
fashioning the substantive rules of land use regulation as they pertain to
wireless communications towers, they should have the corresponding
burden of demonstrating that their decisions are properly predicated on
those rules. This proposition essentially is no different from that
approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Del Monte Dunes where the
Court approved the use of jury determinations of whether "the city's
particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes' final development
proposal was reasonably related to the city's proffered justifications.
3
11
2. Limitations on Time for Action on Permit Applications
The Siting Policy provides that state and local governments must act
upon wireless facilities siting permit applications "within a reasonable
period of time. 3 14 The Supreme Court was reluctant to draw rigid lines
for the duration of development moratoria for Takings Clause purposes
in its recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency.315 However, the Court noted that a number
of states have specific time limits for interim zoning ordinances ranging
309. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B).
310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... ").
311. Id. cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To... provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States .... ).
312. Id. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
313. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 706
(1999).
314. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2000).
315. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). See generally Charles V. Dumas III, Note, Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: The Supreme Court
Reaffirms the Importance of Land-Use Planning and Wisely Refuses To Set Concrete Outer
Limits, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 209, 236-37 (2003).
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from six months to two years.316 Furthermore, the Court noted that "[i]t
may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year
should be viewed with special skepticism.""'
The fact that some states already have statutory limitations pertaining
to delays in issuing land use determinations strongly implies that flat
durational requirements are consistent with the exercise of valid local
police powers. Long delays in making determinations not only earn
skepticism as to underlying motives with respect to the individual
applications, but also lend doubt as to whether delays that ostensibly are
for review of applications in fact are for discrimination among providers
or for prohibitions on wireless service, both of which section 704 already
prohibits.3 8  Should Congress not want to impose absolute durational
limitations on local review on the grounds that this would deprive
municipalities of the ability to deal with unusual situations, it could
temper the requirement by providing for an exception in the case of
extraordinary circumstances, which the locality would have to justify
under a "strong and convincing evidence" standard.3"9
As discussed earlier,320 the total incorporation of the Takings Clause
Williamson County doctrine into the TCA's requirement that local land
use regulators reach decisions "within a reasonable period of time after
the request is duly filed, 311 seems extravagant given the need to balance
against local autonomy the national goals of facilitating commerce and
homeland security. The requirement that courts hear Siting Policy
permit denial cases "on an expedited basis" attests to congressional
322concern about undue delay. The effect of Williamson County is to
facilitate delay by transposing its context from the consideration of the
permit application by local regulators to whether the permit application
is meaningful so as to be duly filed.
A good solution to this problem might be the incorporation within the
TCA siting provisions of the substance of Florida's innovative Bert J.
Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act.323 Under that statute,
government agencies are required to issue a written "ripeness decision
identifying the allowable uses to which the subject property may be
316. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342 n.37.
317. Id. at 341.
318. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i) (2000).
319. Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603, 609 (4th Cir.
1977).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 293-95.
321. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2000).
322. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
323. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West 2004).
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put. '324 In effect, the Bert J. Harris Act requires a locality to provide the
information that the Supreme Court assumed Williamson County would
result in the landowner being supplied-"a final decision regarding how
it will be allowed to develop its property.
325
The TCA could be amended to require not only that a landowner or
wireless service provider receive a decision on a siting application within
a specified time, but also that, at the applicant's election, a denial be
accompanied by a statement enumerating the wireless facilities uses, if
any, to which the property may be put. This would permit the applicant
to file suit in a time frame consistent with Congress's existing mandate
for judicial review "on an expedited basis. 3 26 It also would satisfy the
Supreme Court's concerns in Williamson County that a court act with full
knowledge of the facts.
C. Safe Harbor Rules and Presumptions
Another approach towards amending the Siting Policy to achieve more
balance is the increased use of statutory safe harbor rules. The existing
provision ensuring that applicants can meet any legitimate state or local
radio frequency emissions concern by complying with FCC emissions
standards327 is an example. Similar statutory rules could be put in place
with respect to facilities to be located within existing structures or
structures that primarily serve other functions.
Statutory presumptions could be enacted favoring towers and other
wireless facilities located in areas zoned for industrial or commercial use,
or along four- or six-lane or interstate highways. In areas zoned
residential, presumptions might be keyed to such objective measures as
ratios of tower height to the height of nearby structures, or the distance
between the tower and the property line. If a permit application meets
these statutory requirements, it could be overcome only through clear
and convincing evidence.
324. Id. § 70.001(5)(a). The statute states:
During the 180-day-notice period, [prior to the owner being permitted to file
an action], each of the governmental entities ... shall issue a written ripeness
decision identifying the allowable uses to which the subject property may be put.
The failure of the governmental entity to [comply shall] . .. operate as a ripeness
decision that has been rejected by the property owner. The ripeness decision, as
a matter of law, constitutes the last prerequisite to judicial review, and the matter
shall be deemed ripe or final for the purposes of the judicial proceeding created
by this section, notwithstanding the availability of other administrative remedies.
Id.
325. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190
(1985).
326. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
327. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
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Another approach is modifying the TCA to provide wireless
communications service providers treatment equal to existing public
utilities. As an illustration, in New York the very stringent requirements
otherwise applicable for landowners seeking a use variance... are subject
to a "public utility" exception.329  In Cellular Telephone Co. v.
Rosenberg,"3 ° the New York Court of Appeals held that "a cellular
telephone company is a 'public utility' [and that] ... the construction of
an antenna tower in a residential district to facilitate the supply of
cellular telephone service is a 'public utility building' within the meaning
of a zoning ordinance. 331
While the political imperatives might militate against such an
approach, the TCA could be amended to preempt wireless
communications facilities from local land use regulation, while leaving
state regulation substantially undisturbed. Already, a state's own
immunity from local zoning laws may be shared with private firms
licensed to construct communications towers on state land for use by
wireless telecommunications providers.332 State regulation of wireless
towers would alleviate concerns about distant and obtrusive federal
intervention, while reducing the jockeying that might occur among
adjoining communities, each seeking to have the other provide service to
a multi-jurisdictional area from its side of the boundary line.
Another modification to the TCA that would put wireless
communications service providers on the same footing as other utilities is
to require that they be treated as favorably as fiber-optic cable lines or
other physical utility lines run along public rights of way. Although the
use of government-owned land for wireless towers is somewhat different
than the use of such areas for physical utility lines, electrical
transmissions towers and above-ground amplifying or pumping stations
suggest formulae for the equalization of access charges.
328. Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1939) (requiring that "land cannot
yield a reasonable return if used for [permissible] purpose[es]" and that "the plight of the
owner is due to unique circumstances").
329. In re Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d 105, 111 (N.Y. 1978)
("Instead, the utility must show that modification is a public necessity in that it is required
to render safe and adequate service . . . . [W]here the intrusion or burden on the
community is minimal, the showing required by the utility should be correspondingly
reduced.").
330. 624 N.E.2d 990 (N.Y. 1993).
331. Id. at 993.
332. In re Crown Communication N.Y. v. Dept. of Transp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 898, 901
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (noting that "It]he shared use of the towers is integral to the State
plan of improving its own telecommunications infrastructure and furthers the State's goal
of reducing the proliferation of towers").
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VII. CONCLUSION
In a thoughtful coda to one of its TCA facility siting decisions, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed:
The statute's balance of local autonomy subject to federal
limitations does not offer a single "cookie cutter" solution for
diverse local situations, and it imposes an unusual burden on
the courts. But Congress conceived that this course would
produce (albeit at some cost and delay for the carriers)
individual solutions best adapted to the needs and desires of
particular communities. If this refreshing experiment in
federalism does not work, Congress can always alter the law.333
The FCC noted in 2003 that "the increasing presence of cable and
wireless-based telephone services as well as the advent of broadband
services and other new telecommunications and information services has
already worked changes in the industry to a far greater extent than could
have been reasonably predicted in 1996.",1 4 While the wireless facility
siting rules of the TCA have worked to a limited extent, their leitmotif of
substantially deferential federal procedural checks engrafted upon state
procedure, state substantive law, local ordinances, and most unrestrained
local interpretation of those ordinances is not satisfactory. Similarly, the
original House version of the facilities siting provisions, which imposed
federal preemption, were unsatisfactory. The TCA should be amended
along the lines suggested in this Article so as to achieve a better balance
between commerce and homeland security and local autonomy.
333. Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 17 (1st
Cir. 1999).
334. Triennial Review Order, supra note 30, 6, at 16,985.
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